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We present a dynamical many-body theory of money in which the value of money is a time
dependent “strategic variable” that is chosen by the individual agents. The value of money in
equilibrium is not fixed by the equations, and thus represents a continuous symmetry. The dynamics
breaks this continuous symmetry by fixating the value of money at a level which depends on initial
conditions. The fluctuations around the equilibrium, for instance in the presence of noise, are
governed by the “Goldstone modes” associated with the broken symmetry. The idea is illustrated
by a simple network model of monopolistic vendors and buyers.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ga, Le, 05.40.-a, 05.65.+b, 05.70.Ln, 89.90.+n
I. INTRODUCTION
In classical equilibrium theory in economics [1], agents
submit their demand-vs-price functions to a “central
agent” who then determines the relative prices of goods
and their allocation to individual agents. The absolute
prices are not fixed, so the process does not determine
the value of money, which merely enters as a fictitious
quantity that facilitates the calculation of equilibrium.
Thus, traditional equilibrium theory does not offer a fun-
damental explanation of money, perhaps the most essen-
tial quantity in a modern economy.
Indeed, a “search-theoretic” approach to monetary
economics has been proposed [2–4]. Agents may be ei-
ther money traders, producers, or commodity traders.
They randomly interact with each other, and they decide
whether or not to trade based on “rational expectations”
about the value of a transaction. After a transaction the
agent changes into one of the two other types of agents.
This theory has a steady state where money circulates.
As other equilibrium theories, this theory does not de-
scribe a dynamics leading to the steady state, of sufficient
detail for one to simulate it.
In equilibrium theory, all agents act simultaneously
and globally. In reality, agents usually make decisions
locally and sequentially. Suppose an agent has apples
and wants oranges. He might have to sell his apples to
another agent before he buys oranges from a third agent:
hence money is needed for the transaction, supplying liq-
uidity. It stores value between transactions.
Money is essentially a dynamical phenomenon, since it
is intimately related to the temporal sequence of events.
Our goal is to describe the dynamics of money utiliz-
ing ideas and concepts from theoretical physics and eco-
nomics, and to show how the dynamics may fix the value
of money.
We study a network of vendors and buyers, each of
whom has a simple optimization strategy. Whenever a
transaction is considered, the agent must decide the value
of the goods and services in question, or, equivalently, the
value of money relatively to that of the goods and ser-
vices he intends to buy or sell. He will associate that
value to his money that he believes will maximize his
utility. Thus, the value of money is a “strategic vari-
able” that the agent in principle is free to choose as he
pleases. However, if he makes a poor choice he will loose
utility.
For simplicity, we assume that agents are rather my-
opic: they have short memories, and they take into ac-
count only the properties of their “neighbours”, i.e., the
agents with which they interact directly. They have no
idea about what happens elsewhere in the economy.
Despite the bounded rationality of these agents, the
economy self-organises to an equilibrium state where
there is a spatially homogeneous flow of money. Since
we define the dynamics explicitly, we are, however, also
able to treat the nature of this relaxation to the equi-
librium state, as well as the response of the system to
perturbations and to noise-induced fluctuations around
the equilibrium. These phenomena are intimately related
to the dynamics of the system, and cannot be discussed
within any theory concerned only with the equilibrium
situation.
Our model is a simple extension of Jevons’ [5] exam-
ple of a three agent, three commodity economy with the
failure of the double coincidence of wants, i.e., when only
one member of a trading pair wants a good owned by
the other. A way out of the paradox of no trade where
there is gain to be obtained by all, is to utilize a money
desired by and held by all. Originally this was gold, but
here we show that the system dynamics can attach value
to “worthless” paper money.
We find that the value of money is fixed by a “boot-
strap” process: agents are forced to accept a specific
value of money, despite this value’s global indeterminacy.
The value of money is defined by local constraints in the
network, not by trust. By “local,” we simply mean that
each agent interact only with a very small fraction of
other agents in his neighbourhood.
This situation is very similar to problems with contin-
uous symmetry in physics. Consider, for instance, a lat-
tice of interacting atoms forming a crystal. The crystal’s
physical properties, including its energy, are not affected
by a uniform translation X of all atoms, this transla-
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tional symmetry is continuous. Nevertheless, the posi-
tion x(n) of the nth atom is restricted by the position of
its neighbours. This broken continuous symmetry results
in slow, large-wavelength fluctuations, called Goldstone
modes [6,7] or “soft modes.” These modes are easily ex-
cited thermally, or by noise, and thus gives rise to large
positional fluctuations.
II. THE MODEL:
In our model, we consider N agents, n = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
placed on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic bound-
ary conditions. This geometry is chosen in order to have
a simple and specific way of defining who is interact-
ing with whom. The geometry is not important for our
general conclusions concerning the principles behind the
fixation of prices.
We assume that agents cannot consume their own out-
put, so in order to consume they have to trade, and in
order to trade they need to produce. Each agent pro-
duces a quantity qn, of one good, which is sold at a unit
price pn, to his left neighbour n − 1. He next buys and
consumes one good from his neighbour to the right, who
subsequently buys the good of his right neighbour, etc.,
until all agents have made two transactions. This process
is repeated indefinitely, say, once per day.
For simplicity, all agents are given utility functions of
the same form
un = −c(qn) + d(qn+1) + In ·(pnqn − pn+1qn+1) . (1)
The first term, −c, represents the agent’s cost, or dis-
pleasure, associated with producing qn units of the good
he produces. The displeasure is an increasing function
of q, and c is convex, say, because the agent gets tired.
The second term d, is his utility of the good he can ob-
tain from his neighbour. Its marginal utility is decreasing
with q, so d is concave. This choice of c and d is common
in economics; see, e.g., [3].
An explicit example is chosen for illustration and anal-
ysis,
c(qn) = aq
α
n , d(qn+1) = bq
β
n+1 . (2)
The specific values of a, b, α, and β are not important
for the general results, as long as c remains convex and d
concave. For our analysis we choose a = 12 , b = 2, α = 2,
and β = 12 .
The last term represents the change in utility associ-
ated with the gain or loss of money after the two trades.
Notice that the dimension of In is [utility per unit of
currency], i.e., the physical interpretation is the value of
money.
Each agent has knowledge only about the utility func-
tions of his two neighbours, as they appeared the day
before. The agents are monopolistic, i.e., agent n sets
the price of his good, and agent n − 1 then decide how
much qn, he will buy at that price. This amount is then
produced and sold—there is no excess production. The
goal of each agent is to maximize his utility, by adjust-
ing pn and qn+1, while maintaining a constant (small)
amount of money. Money has value only as liquidity.
There is no point in keeping money, all that is needed is
what it takes to complete the transactions of the day.
Thus, the agents aim to achieve a situation where the
expenditures are balanced by the income:
pnqn − pn+1qn+1 = 0 . (3)
When the value of money is fixed, In =I, the agents
optimize their utility by charging a price
p = 2
1
3 · I−1 (4)
and selling an amount
q = 2−
2
3 (5)
at that price. This is the monopolistic equilibrium.
Note that the resulting quantities q, are independent
of the value of money, which thus represents a continuous
symmetry. There is nothing in the equations that fixes
the value of money and the prices. Mathematically, the
continuous symmetry expresses the fact that the equa-
tions for the quantities are “homogeneous of order one.”
The number of equations is one less than the number
of unknowns, leaving the value of money undetermined.
We shall see how this continuous symmetry eventually is
broken by the dynamics.
Agent n tries to achieve his goal by estimating the
amount of goods qn, that his neighbour will order at a
given price, and the price pn+1, that his other neighbour
will charge at the subsequent transaction.
Knowing that his neighbours are rational beings like
himself, he is able to deduce the functional relationship
between the price pn, that he demands and the amount
of goods qn, that will be ordered in response to this. Fur-
thermore, he is able to estimate the size of pn+1, based on
the previous transaction with his right neighbour. This
enables him to decide what the perceived value of money
should be, and hence how much he should buy and what
his price should be. This process is then continued indef-
initely, at times τ = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
This defines the game. The strategy we investigate
contains the assumption that agents do not change their
valuation of money I, between their two daily transac-
tions, and they maximize their utility accordingly.
The process is initiated by choosing some initial values
for the I’s. They could, e.g., be related to some former
gold standard.
In fixing his price at his first transaction of day τ , agent
n exploits the knowledge he has of his neighbours’ utility
functions, i.e., he knows that the agent to the left will
maximize his function with respect to qn,τ
∂un−1,τ
∂qn,τ
= 0 ; (6)
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hence the left neighbour will order the amount:
qn,τ = (In−1,τ pn,τ )
−2
. (7)
This functional relationship between the amount of
goods qn,τ , ordered by agent n − 1 at time τ and the
price pn,τ , set by agent n, allows agent n to gauge the
effect of his price policy. Lacking knowledge about the
value of In−1,τ , agent n instead estimates it to equal the
value it had in the previous transaction In−1,τ−1, which
he knows. Eliminating qn,τ from Eq. (1) we obtain
un,τ = −1
2
I−4n−1,τ−1p
−4
n,τ + 2
√
qn+1,τ (8)
+ In,τ ·(p−1n,τI−2n−1,τ−1 − pn+1,τqn+1,τ ) .
Maximizing this utility un,τ , with respect to pn,τ and
qn+1,τ yields
pn,τ = 2
1
3 I
−
1
3
n,τ I
−
2
3
n−1,τ−1 , (9)
and
qn+1,τ = (In,τpn+1,τ )
−2
. (10)
By arguments of symmetry,
pn+1,τ = 2
1
3 I
−
1
3
n+1,τ I
−
2
3
n,τ−1 (11)
is the price agent n + 1 will demand of agent n in the
second transaction. Since agent n does not yet know
the value of In+1,τ , he instead uses the known value of
In+1,τ−1 when estimating pn+1,τ .
In the constraint Eq. (3), the following expressions are
used
qn = q
(guess)
n,τ = (In−1,τ−1pn,τ )
−2
, (12)
pn+1 = p
(guess)
n+1,τ = 2
1
3 I
−
1
3
n+1,τ−1I
−
2
3
n,τ−1 , (13)
qn+1 = q
(guess)
n+1,τ =
(
In,τp
(guess)
n+1,τ
)
−2
, (14)
and pn is given by Eq. (9). Solving for In,τ , and evaluat-
ing at time τ + 1, we find [8]
In,τ+1 =
(
I4n−1,τ I
2
n,τ In+1,τ
) 1
7 (15)
which sets agent n’s value of money on day τ + 1 equal
to a weighted geometric average of the value agent n and
his two neighbours prescribed to their money the pre-
vious day. Using this value of In, agent n can fix his
price pn and decide which quantity qn+1, he should op-
timally buy. This simple equation completely specifies
the dynamics of our model. The entire strategy can be
reduced to an update scheme involving only the value
of money—everything else follows from this. Thus, the
value of money can be considered the basic strategic vari-
able.
Although Eq. (15), has been derived for a specific sim-
ple example, we submit that the structure is much more
general. In order to optimize his utility function, the
agent is forced to accept a value of money, and hence
prices, which pertain to his economic neighbourhood.
Referring again to a situation from physics, the position
of an atom on a general lattice is restricted by the po-
sitions of its neighbours, despite the fact that the entire
lattice can be shifted with no physical consequences.
Even though there is no utility in the possession of
money, as explicitly expressed by Eq. (3), the strategies
and dynamics of the model nevertheless leads to a value
being ascribed to the money. The dynamics in this model
is driven by the need of the agents to make estimates
about the coming transactions. In a sense, this mod-
els the real world where agents are forced to make plans
about the future, based on knowledge about the past—
and, in practise, only a very limited part of the past. In
short: the dynamics is generated by the bounded ratio-
nality of the agents.
In the steady state, where the homogeneity of the util-
ity functions give In = In+1, we retrieve the monopolistic
equilibrium equations (4) and (5).
III. SOLVING THE DYNAMICS:
Taking the logarithm in Eq. (15) and introducing
hn,τ = ln(In,τ ) yields the linear equation:
hn,τ+1 =
4
7
hn−1,τ +
2
7
hn,τ +
1
7
hn+1,τ , (16)
describing a Markov process. Now assume that hn,τ is a
slowly varying function of (n, τ) and that we may think
of it as the value of a differentiable function h(x, t) in
(x, t) = (nδx, τδt). Then, expanding to first order in δt
and second order in δx, we find the diffusion equation
∂h(x, t)
∂t
= D
∂2h(x, t)
∂x2
− v ∂h(x, t)
∂x
, (17)
with diffusion coefficient D = 514
(δx)2
δt
, and convection
velocity v = 37
δx
δt
. The generator T , of infinitesimal time
translations is defined by
∂h(x, t)
∂t
= Th(x, t) . (18)
Taking the lattice Fourier transformation, the eigen-
values of T are found to be λk = −k2D − ikv, where
the periodic boundary condition yields k = 2pi
N
l; l =
0, 1, . . . , N − 1. The damping time for each mode k, is
given by tk = (k
2D)−1, i.e., it increases as the square
of the system size N . The only mode that is not damp-
ened has k = 0, and is the soft “Goldstone mode” [6,7]
associated with the broken continuous symmetry with re-
spect to a uniform shift of the logarithm of prices in the
equilibrium:
All prices can be changed by a common factor, but the
amount of goods traded will remain the same. The rest
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of the modes are all dampened (for a finite-size system),
and hence the system eventually relaxes to the steady
state.
Figures 1 and 2 show results from a numerical solution
of Eq. (16) for 1000 agents with random initial values for
the variables h (sampled from a uniform distribution on
the interval [0,2].) Figure 1 shows the spatial variation
of prices at two different times—convection with velocity
v = 37
δx
δt
is clearly seen, while the effect of diffusion is
not visible on this time scale. The relatively weak effect
of diffusion means that spatial price variations, such as
those shown in Fig. 1, can travel around the entire lat-
tice many times before diffusion has evened them out.
Consequently, the individual agent experiences price os-
cillations with slowly decreasing amplitude, as seen in
Fig. 2.
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FIG. 1. Variation of prices for all agents at two dif-
ferent times, τ = 3000 (full line) and τ = 3200 (broken
line.)
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FIG. 2. Price variation for a single agent. The os-
cillations are an artifact due to the periodic boundary
condition, setting hN+1,τ = h1,τ .
Thus, despite the myopic behaviour of agents, the sys-
tem evolves towards an equilibrium. But in contrast to
equilibrium theory, we obtain the temporal relaxation
rates towards the equilibrium, as well as specific abso-
lute values for individual prices. The value of money is
fixed by the history of the dynamical process, i.e., by the
initial condition combined with the actual strategies by
the bounded rational agents.
IV. NOISE
If an agent is suddenly supplied with some extra
amount of money, he will lower his value of money,
hence increase his price and consequently work less and
buy more goods, the effect being inflation propagat-
ing through the system, as described by the solution to
Eq. (17) for a delta-function initial condition [9]. Like-
wise, the destruction or loss of some amount of money
by a single agent will affect the whole system. These are
both transient effects, and in the steady state the same
amount of goods will be produced and consumed, as be-
fore the change.
In general, there might be some noise in the sys-
tem, due to imperfections in the agents’ abilities to op-
timize properly their utility functions, or due to external
sources affecting the utility functions. A random multi-
plicative error in estimating the value of money trans-
forms to a linear noise in Eq. (17). We assume that
the noise η(x, t), has the characteristics: 〈η(x, t)〉 = 0
and 〈η(x, t)η(x′, t′)〉 = Aδ(x − x′)δ(t − t′). Adding it to
Eq. (17) and taking the Fourier transform (with periodic
boundary conditions in a system of size L) one finds the
equal-time correlation function:
〈[h(x) − h(0)][h(x′)− h(0)]〉
=
A
2DL
∑
q
q−2(eiqx − 1)(e−iqx′ − 1) , (19)
where q = 2pi
L
n; n = 0,±1,±2, . . .. For x = x′ and
L→∞ this becomes
〈[h(x) − h(0)]2〉 = A
2D
x , (20)
viz., the dispersion for a biased random walker in one di-
mension with position h, time x, and diffusion coefficient
A
4D . In the presence of noise, the agents no longer agree
about the value of money, and there will be large price
fluctuations. The fluctuations reflect the lack of global
restoring force due to the continuous global symmetry.
How much money is needed to run an economy? In this
model-economy the total amount of money is reflected in
the agents’ I’s, and is always conserved, as seen by
∑
n
(pnqn − pn+1qn+1) = 0 , (21)
since we have periodic boundary conditions. No matter
what the initial amount of money in the system is, the
system will go to the equilibrium where precisely that
amount is needed—the final I’s are fixed by the initial
money supply. The total amount of money in the econ-
omy is irrelevant, since the utility and amount of goods
exchanged in the final equilibrium does not depend on
that. However, as previously described, changes in the
amount of money have interesting transient effects.
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V. CONCLUSION:
Here we considered a simple toy model with simple mo-
nopolistic agents. In general, economy deals with com-
plicated heterogeneous networks of agents, with compli-
cated links to one another, representing the particular
“games” they play with one another. We submit that
the general picture remains the same. At each trade, the
agents evaluate the value of money, by analysing their
particular local situation, and act accordingly. The prices
charged by the agents will be constrained by those of the
interacting agents. It would be interesting to study the
formation and stability of markets where very many dis-
tributed players are interested in the same goods, but not
generally interacting directly with one another. Indeed,
we have considered an allied model with a market struc-
ture introduced in a related, more explicitly economics-
oriented discussion [4].
Modifications of this network model may also provide a
toy laboratory for the study of the effects of the introduc-
tion of the key financial features of credit and bankruptcy
as well as the control problems posed by the governmen-
tal role in varying the money supply.
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